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HELL AND VAGUENESS 
Theodore Sider 
A certain traditional conception of the afterlife is binary. After death one 
proceeds either to heaven or hell. Heaven is very, very good; hell is very, 
very bad. There are no possibilities for the afterlife other than heaven and 
hell, and membership in heaven or hell is never indeterminate or a matter 
of degree. The problem with the binary conception is that it contradicts 
God's justice. God must employ some criterion to decide who goes to heav-
en and who goes to hell. No reasonable criterion would be sharp; any rea-
sonable criterion will have borderline cases. But the binary conception of 
the afterlife allows for no corresponding fuzziness in how the dead are to be 
treated. Hell must therefore contain people who are nearly indiscernible in 
relevant respects from people in Heaven. No just Cod would allow such a 
monstrously unfair thing. 
A certain conception of Hell is inconsistent with God's traditional attribut-
es, or so I will argue. My argument is novel in focusing on considerations 
involving vagueness. 
The target doctrine of Hell is part of a "binary" conception of the after-
life, by which I mean one with the properties of dicizotomy, badness, nOll-uni-
versality, and divine control. Dichotomy: there are exactly two states in the 
afterlife, Heaven and Hell. After death each person will come to be, deter-
minately, in exactly one of these states. (The doctrine of Purgatory does 
not violate dichotomy provided everyone in Purgatory eventually ends up 
in Heaven.) My argument does not apply to a continuous conception of 
the afterlife, which to my mind is more defensible than the usual binary 
doctrine. Badness: Hell is very, very bad. Or at least, Hell is much worse 
than Heaven; for most of the argument this weaker premise will suffice. 
More carefully, the premise is that everyone in Heaven is much, much bet-
ter off than everyone in Hell. Non-universality: some people go to Heaven, 
and some people go to Hell. I have no objection to Universalists, according 
to whom everyone goes to Heaven. Nor does my argument apply to those 
who uphold universal damnation. Divine control: God is in control of the 
institution of divine judgment, in control of the mechanism or criterion that 
determines who goes to Heaven and who goes to Hell. This is not to say 
that God is solely responsible for the fate of created beings, for the divinely 
mandated criterion might contain a role for free choices. Nor is it to say 
that God is vindictive. The requirement makes no assumptions about the 
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nature of the criterion, beyond that it is in God's control. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Given dichotomy, the only possibili-
ties in the afterlife are determinate membership in either Heaven or Hell; 
given badness, the second is far worse the first; and given non-universality, 
each is populated. Divine control requires that God be in control of the cri-
terion determining these populations, and thus that God's choice of a crite-
rion be consistent with his attributes. The criterion of judgment must 
therefore cohere with his perfect justice. This much is straightforward; the 
remainder of the paper will be devoted to filling in the rest. Here is a 
sketch: any just criterion must judge created beings according to a standard 
that comes in degrees, or admits of borderline cases; but no such criterion 
can remain simultaneously just - or at least non-arbitrary - and consis-
tent with the nature of the afterlife just described. 
First, however, I should set aside the Calvinist doctrine of the elect, just 
as I have set aside Universalism. But I set aside Calvinism in a different 
sense, for unlike Universalism, the conclusion of my argument is inconsis-
tent with Calvinism. I set it aside for dialectical reasons, for my argument 
fairly directly begs the question against Calvinism. I assume throughout 
that God's justice is not utterly divorced from our human notion of justice, 
and r will assume that any human notion of justice precludes the criterion 
of selection being pre-natal divine decree. Calvinists will disagree, and I 
have nothing further to say against their position. 
What might the criterion for the afterlife look like? Any just criterion of 
selection, whether for the afterlife or pay raises in the workplace, must 
make its selection depending on certain factors. Moreover, justice requires 
its judgments to be proportional to the factors. If Sal1y's performance is 
better than Jimmy's then, other things being equal, it would of course be 
unjust to pay Jimmy more; but if Sally's performance is only minutely bet-
ter than Jimmy's, it would be unjust to pay Sally far more. Of course, 
human criteria usually fall short of complete justice. College admissions 
offices must sometimes make arbitrary decisions (lithe cutoff must fall 
somewhere"), for admissions officers lack complete information and col-
leges have a limited number of available slots. But God is omniscient, and 
the holding capacities of Heaven and Hell are presumably boundless. 
What J am calling the proportionality of justice prohibits very unequal 
treatment of persons who are very similar in relevant respects. Whatever 
one thinks generally about the nature of justice, its proportionality should 
be acknowledged. 
Given the proportionality of justice and the binary conception of the 
afterlife, it can be argued that the divine criterion cannot be based on a 
moral matter of degree. By this I mean some factor that comes in degrees, 
and whose significance in the divine judgment is proportional to its pres-
ence. Suppose, for example, that the divine criterion is based on how 
many obscenities one utters (the more the worse). Suppose further that 
there are no II gaps" in realized obscenity levels, in that for no n is it the case 
that someone utters n obscenities, someone utters some greater number of 
obscenities, but no one utters n+ 1 obscenities. (This assumption is 
arguably harmless, for we may focus our attention on some possible world 
in which it holds. More on this below.) Now choose some arbitrary 
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damned person, who on Earth uttered some number n of obscenities, and 
begin going through the afterlife, finding persons who were less and less 
obscene. Initially these persons will all be in Hell, but eventually we will 
arrive at one in Heaven. In fact, there must be a sharp cutoff in this proce-
dure: some particular N such that someone with N obscenities is in Hell, 
and someone with N-l obscenities is in Heaven. This is a necessary conse-
quence of i) the lack of gaps in realized obscenity levels, ii) the binary con-
ception of the afterlife, and iii) the current assumption that obscenity is a 
moral matter of degree that is the sole criterion of divine judgment. But 
such a cutoff would be monstrous, for it would blatantly violate the pro-
portional nature of justice. If obscenity really were the sole criterion of the 
afterlife, and its divine significance really were proportional to the amount 
of obscenity present, no just God could give radically different treatment to 
a pair of persons who differed only by a single obscenity. 
No one would seriously propose obscenity as the divine criterion, but 
the argument generalizes to apply to more realistic proposals. Choose any 
moral matter of degree you like: number of charitable donations made, 
number of hungry fed, naked clothed or feet washed, number of random 
acts of kindness performed, or even some amalgam of several factors. 
Given a binary afterlife, there will be someone who just barely made it and 
someone else who just barely missed out. This is impossible, given the 
proportionality of justice. 
My opponent may grant the argument to this point, but yet be 
unmoved. "Your argument is misplaced, for you have focused on works 
to the exclusion of faith. Many think that salvation is given as a gift, not 
earned by accumulating marks on a chit sheet. One can accept this gift by 
believing in Jesus, by asking forgiveness for one's sins, and committing one's 
life to Christ. Thus the argument does not apply, for believing, asking, and 
committing are not matters of degree, nor are they' good works' by which 
one accumulates merit and deserves to go to heaven." 
Whether faith is a "good work" on the basis of which persons deserve to 
go to heaven is irrelevant since my argument does not assume that persons 
"earn" their salvation. It only assumes that God's criterion, C, for deter-
mining status in the afterlife must not violate proportional justice, i.e., that 
God must not treat extremely C-similar persons extremely differently. 'The 
important part of the objection is the claim that the proposed criterion, 
faith, would not be a matter of degree, since believing, asking, and commit-
ting are not matters of degree. 
This last claim is not clearly correct. Much current thinking about ratio-
nality and mind has it that belief is indeed a matter of degree. There is a 
continuum of degrees of belief, or subjective probabilities, one can have in 
a proposition, and there is no distinguished subjective probability marking 
the propositions believed from the rest. Other propositional attitudes come 
in degrees as well. It may be objected that the kind of "belief' required for 
salvation is some state other than the ordinary propositional attitudes; 
however, the reasons for taking belief to come in degrees will presumably 
apply to this other state as well. 
But no matter. Let us grant the objector that her proposed psychological 
state', call it faith, does not come in degrees. This still cannot form the basis 
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of a just divine criterion. The problem is that faith, like all psychological 
states, has borderline cases. We are all familiar with this. There are clear 
cases of insincere statements of faith, for example those of politicians who 
proclaim religion on the campaign trail but leave it behind thereafter. And 
there are clear cases of sincere faith. But what of the endlessly relapsing 
drunkard, who genuinely repents each Sunday only to backslide again on 
Monday? What of the television evangelist who begins with good inten-
tions but is eventually corrupted by the temptations of power? If you reject 
any connection between faith and lifestyle, simply vary the example. 
Perhaps you think the faithful are those who make, at some moment in 
their lives, some confession of faith. But what of the person who confesses 
at age 10, when it is unclear whether he knows what he is doing, and who 
subsequently leads a faithless life? Or a mostly faithless life? Or one who 
confesses at age 9? 8? If on the other hand you deny that any single confes-
sion is critical, consider someone who has a series of borderline sincere 
moments (or days, or weeks, or ... ) of apparent faith, but who is otherwise 
faithless. Or someone on her way to becoming faithful but not determinate-
ly faithful yet, who is struck by a bolt of lightening while in this indetermi-
nate state. Borderline cases might arise in yet another way. Many theolo-
gies contain exceptions for those who, through no fault of their own, never 
heard the Gospel, and consequently lack faith. But surely the exceptions 
will admit of borderline cases: those who heard the Gospel only once, or 
only from corrupt missionaries, or only when very young... There is no 
avoiding borderline cases for a faith-based criterion of divine judgment. 
On the faith-based criterion the definitely faithless go to Hell, and the 
definitely faithful to Heaven. But what of those who are not determinately 
either? There is no sharp line to be drawn between the faithful and the 
faithless, and yet a sharp line is demanded by a binary afterlife, for each 
person must be sent determinately to either Heaven or Hell. The only pos-
sibility would seem to be to draw an arbitrary sharp line somewhere with-
in the region of indeterminacy. But now consider two extremely similar 
persons near the line, one on either side. (Assume, as before, that there are 
no "gaps" in states of faithfulness.) One endures the torments of Hell, but 
is only minutely, insignificantly different from the other who stands in the 
presence of the creator in Heaven. This again violates the proportional 
nature of justice. 
Might God avoid the problem by letting the criterion admit the border-
line faithful as well as the definitely faithful? No, for this ignores higher 
order vagueness. Just as there is no sharp line to be drawn between the 
faithful and the faithless, there is no sharp line to be drawn between the 
definitely faithless and the indeterminately faithful. An arbitrary choice 
would still need to be made, and the criterion would then fail to be just. 
The objectionable sharp cutoffs any such faith-based criterion must 
make can be brought out in a different way. Many will believe that faith, 
like any mental state, supervenes on the physical makeup of the brain. So 
consider any of the faithful in Heaven, and consider the results of minute 
perturbations of this supervenience basis in ways that pushes that person 
closer to being faithless. Remove an electron here, disrupt a neuron there, 
and eventually the person will be definitely faithless. In between there will 
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be a very long string of mental states, M 1, ... Mil: Ml the state of someone 
faithful, Mn the state of someone faithless, and a vast number of intermedi-
ate states in addition, each extremely similar to the immediately adjacent 
states. Some, for example certain dualists, will object to the assumption 
that the mental supervenes. But even the dualist is familiar with the depth 
and complexity of the human soul, and should accept something like my 
sequence M 1, ... , Mil' though it will not be based on variation of physical 
realizations. Either way, the sequence may be constructed. Consider, then, 
a possible world containing n persons, one in each of these mental states. 
The first goes to Heaven, the last to Hell. Begin with the first and move 
down the list, one by one. Since membership in Heaven and Hell is deter-
minate, and everyone goes to exactly one, it follows that there must be a 
first member of this sequence who goes to Hell. Goofus, who has mental 
state Mi' goes to Hell, whereas Gallant, with mental state Mi-l' goes to 
Heaven. But provided we choose n large enough, Goofus and Gallant will 
be extremely similar. It is impossible to believe that a just God would treat 
such a pair so differently.2 
There is no U slippery slope fallacy" being committed here, for it is built 
into the binary conception of the afterlife that Heaven and Hell have no 
borderline cases. Thus the argument succeeds where familiar sorites argu-
ments (somehow!) fail. Begin with a heap, and begin removing grains of 
sand. Surely there is no one grain whose removal destroys the heap, and 
yet eventually (for example when there is only one grain left) there is no 
heap. How can this be? I have no answer; but it surely turns, somehow, 
on the fact that there are borderline cases of heaps. 
Not everyone accepts this. There is a view about the nature of vague-
ness called epistemicism, which currently enjoys remarkable popularity, 
according to which no meaningful predicate has borderline cases.3 There 
really is a single grain that destroys the heap, though we cannot know 
which. Epistemicism challenges my argument's assumption of borderline 
cases of faith. It might also be thought to rescue the binary conception of 
the afterlife. The epistemicist's sharp boundaries may be hidden from us, 
but God sees all. Thus God could use a faith-based criterion of salvation, 
sending people to Heaven or Hell depending on where they fall with 
respect to the humanly inaccessible but divinely known precise standard. 
This response inherits the intrinsic implausibility of epistemicism, which 
I take to be considerable. No one, not even God, could know the cutoff 
point for having faith, for no such cutoff exists. But this point need not be 
pressed, for even the epistemicist's sharp cutoffs would not provide a just 
criterion. Consider again our sequence MI' ... , Mn of mental states. The 
epistemicist postulates a sharp cutoff in the extension of 'faith': Mi-I is in 
while Mi is out. Thus the epistemicist grants semantic significance to the 
difference between Mi-I and Mi' It would be quite another thing to grant 
important moral significance to this distinction. Nothing in epistemicism 
implies that the proposed semantic cutoffs are due to unknown factors that 
have special significance of any kind, whether ontological or moral. Nor 
should it. There is no hidden ontological halo that a collection of grains of 
sand suddenly loses when it ceases to be a heap. Nor do the epistemicist's 
cutoffs correspond to moral halos. The epistemicist postulates a kind of 
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semantic halo by distinguishing Mi from Mi-l' and it is a great mystery just 
how this is to be secured" but however it is secured it surely is not by 
granting ontological or moral significance to the cutoff. Thus, even if epis-
temicism is true, God could not justly send Gallant to Heaven and Goofus 
to Hell. Granted, Gallant is faithful where Goofus is not; but in this case 
this distinction is one without great moral significance. One cannot both 
uphold epistemicism and continue to believe that differences in vague 
predicates always retain the significance we previously took them to have.5 
Suppose a single hair falls out one morning in the shower. If epistemicism 
is true, this loss may place me for the first time in the ranks of the bald; but 
even so, were 1 to be informed of this fact, 1 would have no more reason to 
lament that hair than the one lost the previous morning. 
Delicate issues lurk. I say that the epistemicist's cutoffs for predicates 
like 'faith' and 'bald' lack rational and moral significance; but for the epis-
temicist, terms expressing rational and moral significance have sharp cut-
offs as well. Just as there is a sharp cutoff for 'bald', so there is a sharp cut-
off for 'state of hairlessness for which I have reason to lament'. Perhaps the 
epistemicist must admit the significance of the cutoffs after all! The ques-
tion here is one of importance for epistemicists generally, not just those 
defending Hell: does epistemicism entail implausible distinctions of moral 
significance? 
It is true that epistemicism implies a first state of hairlessness I have rea-
son to lament. But this need not be objectionable (or at any rate, any more 
objectionable than epistemicism itself). For it may yet be that this first lam-
entable state is not much more lamentable than adjacent states. That is, it 
would be consistent for the epistemicist to deny the inference from 'state 
Hi is not lamentable but state Hi+l is lamentable' to 'state Hi+l is much 
more lamentable than state H(. This connection between the binary predi-
cate 'lamentable' and the comparative predicate 'much more lamentable 
than' can be denied. Likewise, the epistemicist may accept a precise cutoff 
point for the predicate 'has merit for the afterlife' without admitting the 
justice of treating Goofus and Gallant differently, for even if only Gallant 
has merit for the afterlife, it does not follow that Gallant has much more 
merit. Proportional justice still prohibits treating Goofus and Gallant dras-
tically differently. 
But now what of the predicate 'can be sent to Hell without violating 
proportional justice, given who has been sent to Heaven'? I cannot consis-
tently admit a precise cutoff in tlzis predicate. So has the epistemicist got an 
answer to my argument after all? I think not. Even for the epistemicist, 
not all predicates have precise cutoffs, for some predicates are meaningless. 
Nonsense predicates, such as 'slithy tove' are an instance of this. 
Meaninglessness might also result from under-specification. Suppose I 
introduce the term 'small' by stipulating that integers below 17 are small 
and integers above ]98 are not small. Rather than admitting that my usage 
of 'small' has an unknown precise cutoff, the epistemicist may want to 
deny that I have introduced a meaningful predicate.6 A third source of 
meaninglessness (or incoherence) would be over-specification: either inter-
nal incompatibility of stipulations, Of, more to the point, incompatibility of 
the stipulations with epistemicism itself. Imagine giving an otherwise 
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acceptable introduction of some predicate, but then adding a "meaning 
postulate" to the effect that the predicate has no sharp cutoff. The epis-
temicist cannot admit that the term is both meaningful and obeys the stipu-
lation. But this is just what is going on with the predicate 'can be sent to 
Hell without violating proportional justice'. Given the binary afterlife, it is 
built into the meaning of this term that it cannot have sharp cutoffs; epis-
temicists must presumably deny it is meaningfuF Thus, this epistemicist 
objection to my argument cannot be sustained. 
(One might worry that my argument could then no longer be offered by 
an epistemicist, for the argument employs a term that is arguably meaning-
less: 'it would be (proportionally) just to do X'. But the argument may be 
recast using the comparative term 'more-just-than'. Consider a judge who 
would send Goofus to Hell and Gallant to Heaven. All the argument 
needs is the plausible premise that God is more just than that.) 
We have seen that faith cannot be a just criterion for a binary afterlife, 
because of its vagueness. This generalizes. Any proposed criterion that 
admits borderline cases will need to draw an arbitrary sharp line, which 
leads to injustice. Neither can the divine criterion be based on factors that 
come in degrees, as was argued earlier. But what else is left? There are no 
other plausible factors that could be used in the divine criterion. Once 
vague factors and factors that come in degrees are set aside, only precise 
factors that do not come in degrees remain. But the only such factors of this 
sort that come to mind are those that are derived, via arbitrary choices, from 
other factors that come in degrees or have borderline cases. There is, for 
example, the factor of uttering no more than 1,000,006 obscenities in one's 
lifetime (and even that is imprecise given the vagueness in 'obscenity', 
'utter', and so on). And there are "precisifications" of 'faith': precise prop-
erties whose extensions include the definitely faithful, but also some arbi-
trary subset of the indeterminately faithfu1.8 Any criterion based on such 
factors clearly suffers the same fate as those considered above, for it would 
treat persons who are significantly similar in radically differently ways. 
Precision could be attained if God were a perfectionist, allowing only 
the perfectly good (or faithful, or whatever) into Heaven. It could perhaps 
also be attained if God were completely indiscriminate, banning only the 
perfectly depraved (if such a state exists). But assuming that, as a matter of 
contingent fact, no one is either wholly good or wholly bad, this would 
violate the assumption of non-universality: either universal salvation or 
universal damnation would follow. 
This completes my argument against the binary conception of the after-
life. Can the argument be resisted? My argument invokes two persons 
that are extremely morally similar, one in Heaven, the other in Hell. But if 
there are "gaps" in the distribution of morally relevant qualities, we cannot 
be sure that there is any such pair of persons. I ruled this out by stipulat-
ing that we are to consider a possible world in which gaps are absent, but it 
might be objected that God insures that there are no persons near the cutoff 
point of the divine criterion. One then wonders what happens in the possi-
ble worlds in which gaps are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps 
are metaphysically necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds 
without gaps some component of the binary conception of hell would need 
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to be abandoned. I am somewhat inclined to object that it would be unbe-
coming for God to use a criterion that would allow for possible cases of 
injustice if applied in every possible world, even if those cases do not actu-
ally arise. But the more important objection to the assumption of gaps is 
that it is manifestly false. Every morally or spiritually relevant factor we 
encounter in our lives is quite clearly a smear. The reply claims that the 
world has precise moral or spiritual joints, but as a matter of contingent 
fact these simply do not exist. 
A more powerful objection to my argument would challenge the assump-
tion of the proportionality of justice. Consider the following parable: 
For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out early in 
the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard. He agreed to pay 
them a denarius for the day and sent them into his vineyard. About 
the third hour he went out and saw others standing in the market-
place doing nothing. He told them, "You also go and work in my 
vineyard, and I will pay you whatever is right. So they went. He 
went out again about the sixth hour and the ninth hour and did the 
same thing. About the eleventh hour he went out and found still oth-
ers standing around. He asked them, "Why have you been standing 
here all day long doing nothing?" "Because no one has hired us," 
they answered. He said to them, "You also go and work in my vine-
yard." When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his 
foreman, "Call the workers and pay them their wages, beginning 
with the last ones hired and going on to the first." The workers who 
were hired about the eleventh hour came and each received a denar-
ius. So when those came who were hired first, they expected to 
receive more. But each one of them also received a denarius. When 
they received it, they began to grumble against the landowner. 
"These men who were hired last worked only one hour," they said, 
"and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of 
the work and the heat of the day." But he answered one of them, 
"Friend, I am not being unfair to you. Didn't you agree to work for a 
denarius? Take your pay and go. I want to give the man who was 
hired last the same as 1 gave you. Don't I have the right to do what I 
want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am gener-
ous?" (Matthew 20: 1-15 (NIV)). 
The parable seems most directly a reply to a challenge to Heaven rather 
than Hell. If Heaven contains both the solidly faithful and those that "just 
scraped by", cannot the solidly faithful complain that their reward should 
be greater? Note the difference in form from my challenge. The workers 
claim that it is unjust to reward equally those with very different merit, 
whereas I claim that it is unjust to "reward" very differently those with 
(nearly) equal merit. Nevertheless, the parable can be turned into a 
defense of Hell. Its general moral seems to be this: so long as one violates 
no "intrinsic" or "absolute" obligations, it is not unjust to be generous to 
some but not all. Given this moral, one might go on to deny that justice is 
"proportional" in the sense introduced above: it is not unjust to treat very 
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similar people very differently, provided one respects all one's intrinsic or 
absolute obligations. 
This could be turned into a defense of Hell as follows. For simplicity, 
imagine that the divine criterion is based on some linear factor F, and 
imagine some degree D of F that in some intrinsic or absolute sense clearly 
does /lot merit entry into Heaven: setting aside any comparisons with how 
God treats others, it would be just for God to send someone with degree D 
of F to Hell. (That there is some such degree is presupposed by this objec-
tion. One version of this would be to claim that we all deserve Hell, no 
matter how virtuous or faithful we are, that God would be within his 
rights sending us all to Hell.) God would violate no direct obligation if he 
(somewhat arbitrarily) set the cutoff point at level D of F, or even lower. 
To be sure, there will be persons just barely worse than D in Hell and per-
sons just barely better than D in Heaven. Goofus in Hell would protest 
that Gallant's earthly F-efforts were only slightly better than his, and yet 
Gallant has been admitted into Heaven. God's reply: "Friend, I am not 
being unfair to you. Don't you agree that your degree of F merits Hell? J 
want to be generous to Gallant, and I choose not to be to you. Don't I have 
the right to do what I want with my own creation?" 
This" absolutist" conception of justice is supposed to be supported by the 
claim that the landowner in the parable is not being unjust. In fact it is 
unclear to me whether even that is true, whether the landowner is being 
unjust, but set that aside. A more critical problem is that the imagined 
words of God to Goofus are far worse than those of the landowner - the 
two cases are not parallel. Human landowners have limited funds, and so 
must limit their generosity. Moreover, we rarely hold humans to standards 
of perfection, and hence might not criticize the landowner, who after all is 
being more generous than ordinary morality demands. Thus, our reactions 
to the landowner parable are an unreliable guide to perfect justice. 
There is a further asymmetry between the cases. Perhaps it is not unjust 
to be arbitrarily generous when this involves bestowing some benefit on an 
otherwise happy person; it is harder to admit the justice of arbitrarily res-
cuing some from horrible agony while abandoning relevantly similar oth-
ers to their fate. This final asymmetry depends on Hell being very bad, 
rather than being merely much worse than Heaven. That would be reject-
ed by some thinkers, for example C. S. Lewis in The Great Divorce, who con-
ceives of Hell as separation from God rather than torment.9 But even if 
Hell is not so bad, if it is much worse than Heaven God would be whimsi-
cally generous in granting the gift of Heaven to Gallant but not Goofus. I 
say that whimsical generosity is unjust; or, more cautiously, that it falls 
short of God's perfect justice. Some may disagree. But even they face a 
hard question. Set aside justice: would God be whimsically generous? My 
guess is that most Christians would reject the idea that God would behave 
in such a seemingly arbitrary fashion. 
ll1ere can be no such place as Hell, under its usual conception as part of 
a binary afterlife, for there is no criterion for judgment that God could 
employ. The continuity of morally significant factors is flatly in contradic-
tion with God's justice (or at least God's non-arbitrariness) and a binary 
afterlife. Christians should either reject the notion of divine judgment alto-
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gether, or claim that in the afterlife, as in life, there is no black and white, 
only shades of grey.'0 
Syracuse University 
NOTES 
1. It might be objected that faith is a relationship between a person and 
God, not a mental state of the person taken in isolation. But God only enters 
into that relationship with some. Unless God is arbitrary (and hence W1just), 
there must be some feature of the faithful human in virtue of which God enters 
into this relation. We can distinguish "thin faith", which is just this feature, 
from "thick faith", which is this feature plus God's contribution to the relation-
ship. By 'faith' I intend thin faith. 
For an interesting discussion of the nature of faith, see William Alston, 
"Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith", in Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-
Snyder, eds., Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1996). Among other things Alston argues that faith should be con-
strued as involving "acceptance" rather than belief since the former but not the 
latter is under one's voluntary control. Like belief, acceptance surely has 
degrees or borderline cases. 
2. This and other parts of the argument are similar to an argument for 
temporal parts in my "Four-Dimensionalism", The Philosophical Review 106 
(1997): 197-231. In assuming the existence of the series Ml' ... , Mn it is not 
assumed that belief has a linear underlying basis, only that ffiere is some linear 
way of proceeding (in small steps) from M1 to M . 
3. See Roy Sorensen, Blindspots (OXford: Itlarendon Press, 1988) and 
Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994). 
4. See Williamson, Vagueness, §7.5. 
5. Thus I "argue from below", in Mark Johnston's sense: I note the under-
lying nature of faith according to epistemicism, and argue for a deflationary 
conclusion about its significance. (More carefully, I argue that the cutoff point 
is not especially significant; J do not argue that faith has no significance at all.) 
Mark Johnston objects to similar arguments from below in "Human Concerns 
without Superlative Selves", in Jonathan Dancy, ed., Reading Parfit (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997). I reject any general prohibition of argument from below (not 
that Johnston advocates such a prohibition). Our values should be open to crit-
icism, and what better basis for criticism than exploration of the underlying 
nature of their objects? 
6. Some other responses to this sort of argument are discussed in 
Williamson's "Imagination, Stipulation and Vagueness", in Enrique 
Villanueva, ed., Philosophical Issues 8, Truth (Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1997). 
7. Some might claim that even non-evaluative predicates, such as 'heap', 
have the lack of sharp cutoffs built into their meaning, and thus epistemicism 
has the untoward consequence that all such predicates are meaningless or inco-
herent. But whether there is any such thing built in to the meaning of 'heap' is 
surely a matter for theory - epistemicists can reasonably deny that there is. 
8. It should not be pretended that there is a linear arrangement of the bor-
derline faithful. The notion of a precisification is that of the supervaluationists. 
See Williamson's Vagueness, chapter 5. 
9. New York: The Macmillan company, 1946. Lewis's conception of Hell 
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potentially raises another challenge, to the inclusion of divine control as one of 
the defining factors of the binary conception of the afterlife. It might be argued 
that God does not control the criterion of selection, for we separate ourselves 
from God. But taken at face value this would violate the principle of dichoto-
my as well, and would thus depart from the core of the binary conception of 
the afterlife which is my target. If status in the afterlife is purely a function of 
the degree to which one has separated oneself from God, then since there is a 
continuum of states of separation, there would need to be a continuum of 
states in the afterlife. 
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